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SUMMARY 
Petitions to Scotland’s central civil court, the Court of Session, contained 
common features of style despite being presented for a wide range of 
purposes. As well as being employed in the course of procedure in a 
number of litigated cases, the petition was used to obtain entry to an office, 
or in seeking an equitable remedy which might relieve imminent suffering. 
In many cases they offer detailed narratives about everyday life, 
commerce, politics and religion which preserve a great deal that may be of 
value to the legal and social historian. Some petitioners, such as the poor 
and vulnerable, enjoyed a privileged status entitling them to have their 
claims heard summarily. A number of petitions, written by lawyers in order 
to persuade, contain ideas about liberty, justice and reason reflecting the 
fact that they were addressed to a court of both law and equity. This 
contribution identifies the features of such petitions, attempts to classify 
them, and considers their wider historical significance. 
 
 
This article discusses eighteenth-century petitions in the Court of Session, 
Scotland’s central civil court. The court comprised 15 judges: 14 lords 
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ordinary and a lord president. While individual lords ordinary heard cases 
at first instance in the Outer House, and dealt with summary bills and 
evidential matters, the ‘hail [whole] fifteen’ sat collectively in the Inner 
House of the court to determine points reported to them for decision. They 
enjoyed an extensive jurisdiction as a court of first instance, and also in 
review of judgments made in local courts or interlocutors [decrees] made 
by their own lords ordinary. 
 The number of petitions entering the court has never been 
systematically quantified. While Scots generally enjoyed a reputation for 
litigiousness, there is evidence across the eighteenth century of a rise and 
fall in court business, with the nadir being reached in the 1740s.1 Research 
has produced some figures for the number of actions and petitions in the 
year 1600 which indicate that only 11 petitions were presented, although 
some 56 ‘supplications’ and eight pleas for release from the tolbooth 
[burgh jail] were made.2 A ‘supplication’, a term not generally found used 
in the court by the eighteenth century, does not appear to have been 
substantively different from a petition, examples being supplications 
                                                             
1 J. Finlay, The Community of the College of Justice (Edinburgh, 2012), pp. 22, 139. 
2 W. Coutts, The Business of the Court of Session in 1600 (Edinburgh, 2003), pp. 23, 
51. 
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asking the lords to replace arbiters or to order the production of evidence.3 
In the seventeenth century, petitioners in the court sometimes used the 
word ‘supplicants’ in their petition to describe themselves, therefore it is 
not unreasonable to regard supplications as functionally the same thing as 
petitions.4 
 A judicial petition differed from some other types of petition. It was 
always addressed to the court; it always followed a particular legal style, 
and it sought a relatively narrow and defined outcome which, if the petition 
were competently brought, would have been within the jurisdiction of the 
court to provide. Such petitions were generally, although not always, 
drafted by a practising lawyer and submitted to one of the clerks of court 
according to a regulated procedure. 
 A petition might be brought in the name of an individual or a 
corporate body. As Robert Bennet, the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, 
understood it, the right to bring a petition was shared by every subject in 
the realm. According to him, ‘the Right of Petitioning is a Natural Right, 
competent to every Subject in particular, and declared to be their Priviledge 
                                                             
3 Finlay, Community of the College of Justice, pp. 66, 75. 
4 For example, National Records of Scotland [NRS], Court of Session, Books of 
Sederunt, CS1/7, fo. 16r; CS1/9, fo. 44v. 
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by the Claim of Right’, a constitutionalist statement of rights produced in 
the Anglo-Scottish Revolution of 1688–89.5 
 Petitions have a particular value for social and other historians in that 
they often preserve detailed information – concerning commercial 
activities, electioneering or relationships for example – which might not be 
found elsewhere. Glimpses of unique fact situations and everyday life 
appear in petitions in a way that often casts light on human interaction and 




The classic definition of a petition in Scots law is that given by James 
MacLaren in his 1916 book on Court of Session practice: 
 
                                                             
5 Advocates’ Library Session Papers [ALSP], Miscellaneous collection, vol. 16 
(1709–51), Information for Mr. Robert Bennet Dean of Faculty and The other 
Advocates Complained upon at the instance of Her Majesty’s Advocate (n.d.), p. 9. 
According to the 1689 Claim of Right, ‘it is the right of the subjects to petition the 
king and that all imprisonments and prosecutions for such petitioning are contrary 
to law’. See K. Bowie’s contribution in this Special Issue for a discussion of the right 
to petition in Scotland. 
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an ex parte application craving the authority of the Court for the 
petitioner, or seeking the Court to ordain another person, to do an act 
or acts which otherwise the petitioner would be unable to do, or cause 
to be done.6 
 
A petition differed from a summons because it did not run in the name of 
the sovereign and it was never dealt with by means of solemn procedure. 
Technically, a summons could pass under the signet in the monarch’s name 
but a petition had no authority to do that because it emanated not from the 
crown but from a private party. Therefore a petition could not usually be 
served on another party without the prior authority of the court. 
 By definition, a petition was a written application. Oral motions were 
also made in court and, quite naturally, their terms have not survived unless 
they were summarized in a minute or referred to in another source. Judges 
sometimes explicitly preferred to receive a written paper rather than an oral 
motion. As the advocate Andrew Crosbie noted to one client in 1764, even 
in the routine matter of setting a date for the advising of his cause, ‘the 
                                                             
6 J.A. MacLaren, Court of Session Practice (Edinburgh, 1916), p. 825. 
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President would not do it on a motion but ordered a Petition which goes in 
tomorrow’.7 
 
The petition and complaint 
A petition differed from a complaint because a complaint invoked the 
criminal, or, in the case of the Court of Session, the quasi-criminal 
jurisdiction of the court. There was, however, the possibility of raising a 
procedure known as a ‘petition and complaint’. This might be raised 
against anyone accused of malversation of a public office, such as a 
magistrate or a Court of Session judge, or for a contempt of court or another 
type of misconduct which was subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Session or Scotland’s highest criminal court, the Court of Justiciary. 
 The Faculty of Advocates brought a petition and complaint before the 
commissioners of justiciary in 1736 when three of their members were 
named to serve as jurors in the prosecution of Captain Porteous, a 
contentious murder case, despite being exempt from such service.8 An 
example of misconduct is the petition and complaint brought in 1741 by 
the advocate Michael Menzies, in order to vindicate himself from what he 
                                                             
7 National Library of Scotland [NLS], Sharpe of Hoddam papers, Acc. 13218/3, fo. 
38. 
8 NLS, Saltoun papers, MS 17539, fo. 134. 
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referred to as ‘violent Reflections’ made against him by counsel for his 
opponents.9 In respect of the ‘false, injurious and malicious’ reflections 
made upon his conduct, Menzies craved ‘such redress, and ... Reparation 
... as to your Lordships shall seem just’. Given the tendency of those 
writing petitions, sometimes at the behest of angry and frustrated clients, 
to insert text containing personal attacks on their opponent, it is not 
particularly difficult to find parties, sometimes quite vulnerable people, 
using petitions and complaints to vindicate their character.10 
 
Elements of a petition 
All petitions consisted of the same familiar elements. First, there was the 
address. In the Court of Session, the phrase primarily used in the eighteenth 
century was ‘Unto the Right Honourable, the Lords of Council and 
Session’. An earlier version ran: ‘My Lords of Council and Session, Unto 
your Lordships humbly means and shews Your Servitrix’. 11  Until a 
                                                             
9 ALSP, Hamilton Gordon collection, 2nd series (Ma–Mo), The Petition and 
Complaint of Mr Michael Menzies Advocate, 12 February 1741. 
10 For example, ALSP, Arniston collection, vol. 42, no. 14, The Petition and Complaint 
of David Forbes, late serjeant in the second Regiment of Guards, called the 
Coldstream Regiment, 28 November 1758. 
11 ALSP, Forbes collection, vol. 2, p. 1427, The Petition for Janet Pitcairn, spouse to 
George Home Town Clerk of Edinburgh and him for his interest, 28 February 1705. 
8 
legislative change in 1857, petitions were always addressed to the Inner 
House, not to a lord ordinary sitting in the court’s Outer House.12 After the 
creation of two divisions in 1808, it was competent to present some kinds 
of petition to either division of the Inner House, rather than to provide 
copies to all the judges.13 Traditionally, the lords of session had boxes in 
the waiting room of the Inner House into which petitions were to be placed. 
The reason for this, as Lord Stair (Sir James Dalrymple of Stair) noted in 
the seventeenth century, was to relieve petitioners of the need to go to the 
various dwelling places of the judges and also to prevent ‘the occasion of 
solicitation’, or private lobbying.14 
 Following the address of the petition came the name and designation 
of the petitioner. There then followed, after the phrase ‘Humbly Sheweth’ 
which was a clear indication of respect for the court and the inferior status 
of the petitioner, the narrative setting out the facts which gave rise to the 
petition. Finally, there was the prayer, setting out the request or complaint 
of the petitioner. In the Court of Session, this ended with the phrase ‘May 
                                                             
12 Court of Session Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict., c.56), s.4. 
13 R. Bell, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, ed. G. Watson 
(Edinburgh, 1890), sub nom. ‘petition’. 
14 D.M. Walker (ed.), J. Dalrymple (Viscount Stair), The Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland: deduced from its originals, and collated with the civil, canon and feudal 
laws, and with the customs of neighbouring nations (Edinburgh, 1981), IV.2.12. 
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it please your Lordships’, to ‘consider the premisses’ and authorize an act, 
or make an order; or, in the most common type of petition, alter an 
interlocutor under review, with the final phrase ‘According to justice, and 
your Lordships Answer’, later abbreviated to ‘According to justice, &c’. 
 The style of such petitions differed little from other types of formal 
petition in a legal context, such as petitions to parliament. Of course, the 
addressee differed, with the king or his high commissioner ‘and the 
Honourable Estates of Parliament’ replacing the judges. So also did the 
closing prayer, with some phrase being used such as ‘And your Grace and 
Lordships Petitioner shall ever pray’.15 Printed petitions in later Court of 
Session practice, at least from the second decade of the eighteenth century, 
always bore a date, but, frustratingly for historians, that was not necessarily 
true of earlier handwritten petitions, although the dates of hearings can 
usually be traced in the Outer House rolls. 
Purposes of petitions 
Petitions were the appropriate form of procedure in a number of 
circumstances and it is useful to place those circumstances into categories, 
working from specific types to the more general. 
                                                             
15 An example is John Spottiswoode’s (undated) petition to parliament seeking the 
barony of New Abbey which had belonged to his grandfather: ALSP, Forbes 
collection, vol. 6, p. 6203. 
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1. Petitions relative to offices 
In the first place, it was necessary to petition for authority to hold some 
public office, that of lawyer being the most obvious example. Anyone 
desirous of becoming an advocate had first to petition the lords of session; 
any member of the Society of Writers to the Signet (with exclusive rights 
to draft certain documents used before the Court of Session) seeking to 
take on an apprentice would petition the keeper and commissioners of the 
signet for permission to enter an indenture. 16  In the sheriff court, 
procurators were likewise required to petition the judge for admission. In 
the case of those seeking admission as a notary public, the first step was 
slightly different in that it consisted of the clerk to the admission of notaries 
issuing the candidate with a formal writ (known as a presentation), in the 
name of the sovereign, which informed the lords of session that the 
candidate had been admitted a notary provided they found him to be 
qualified.17 Presumably this was necessary because notaries, at least from 
the sixteenth century, were an exclusively royal appointment and 
                                                             
16 For example, NRS, Leith-Buchanan of Ross and Drummakil papers, GD47/418 
(Archibald Tod’s petition in 1782 to take on an apprentice W.S.). 
17 Royal Commission to inquire into the Courts of Law in Scotland, Fifth Report, 
Appendix, 1871, vol. XX.257, C 260, p. 47. 
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constitutionally the direct involvement of the crown was necessary, 
however formal and limited that may have been.18 In the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, a petition for a letter from the king was 
necessary.19 
 The type of office for which a petition was necessary included that of 
curator bonis [a person appointed by the Court of Session to manage the 
property of another party temporarily] and judicial factor [a similar 
function, but in a more permanent capacity]. Such petitions were generally 
straightforward, but complications could easily arise. An example is the 
1739 petition of Lilias Mackenzie, the wife of Murdoch Morison, a 
merchant in Stornoway on the western isle of Lewis.20 Initially, Lilias 
petitioned for the appointment of a factor on the basis that her husband was 
‘in a State of Furiosity’, requiring a factor to look after his affairs while the 
disease lasted. That petition was remitted to Lord Kilkerran, the lord 
                                                             
18 The clerk to the admission of notaries public, a member of the College of Justice, 
was appointed by the crown under the great seal. The lords of session only had 
authority to appoint interim holders of the office. 
19 Examples of royal letters can be found in NRS, Warrants of admissions of notaries, 
NP3/3. 
20 ALSP, Hamilton Gordon collection, 2nd series (Mck–McM), The Petition of Lilias 
Mackenzie, spouse to Murdoch Morison Merchant in Stornoway in the Island of 
Lewis, 23 July 1739.  
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ordinary, to take evidence, but he reported to the Inner House, and the 
judges decided, that there was insufficient evidence of mental illness. 
Lilias therefore had to petition again, this time for a commission to be 
granted to ‘any person of credit’ on Lewis to take evidence from witnesses, 
on the ground that bringing witnesses to Edinburgh was prohibitively 
expensive. Indeed, given that there was no messenger-at-arms within 50 
miles of Lewis, even citing witnesses was difficult. 
 As well as petitioning for appointment to offices, there were also, in 
special circumstances, petitions for authority to demit or continue in office. 
In 1731 Sir Hew Dalrymple petitioned, after 54 years as an advocate and 
judge, for the privilege of being excused constant attendance on the bench 
as lord president under an Act of Parliament of 1597 in favour of aged and 
infirm judges.21 A few examples such as this demonstrate that in certain 
instances there was no alternative mechanism other than a petition that 
could be used to obtain the authority of the court for a particular course of 
action. 
2. Privileged petitions 
Some groups enjoyed a privileged status as petitioners. This was in line 
with the privileged summonses which the Court of Session, from 1532, 
                                                             
21 NRS, Court of Session, Books of Sederunt, CS1/11, fo. 215v. 
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specified should be heard in a summary fashion.22 In the sixteenth century, 
there is regular mention of such privileged summonses being heard 
summarily due to the status of the person bringing them: this included the 
poor, widows, orphans, and members of the College of Justice. 
 For the poor and vulnerable, having an action heard quickly was very 
important and some petitions reveal tragic tales of bereavement, ill health 
and lack of opportunity, made worse by the circumstances giving rise to 
litigation. One 1743 petition began with the following note: ‘It is intreated 
by both Parties, that the Lords would be pleased to advise this Cause, the 
Aliment [maintenance] of Four Fatherless Children depending on the 
Decision thereof.’23 
 For College of Justice members, the privilege of having cases heard 
in Edinburgh was a matter of convenience, both personally and for their 
clients. Having to attend if summoned to a local court, during the sitting of 
the Court of Session, would cause unnecessary delay. At the same time, 
lawyers were themselves often litigious and it suited them to be able to 
                                                             
22 J. Finlay, Men of Law in Pre-Reformation Scotland (East Linton, 2000), pp. 72–3, 
83, 101. 
23 ALSP, Elchies paper, vol. 14, Answers for Elizabeth Maccombie, Relict of then 
deceas’d John Middleton Merchant in Aberdeen To the PETITION of John 
Robertson of Pitmillen, and others, Executors of the Will of the deceas’d James 
Maccombie Merchant in Aberdeen. 
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raise cases directly in Edinburgh. A quick hearing also ensured that any 
threats against them from unhappy litigants would be dealt with speedily.24 
In the High Court of Justiciary, petitions from prisoners were common. 
The 1701 Act concerning criminal procedure imposed deadlines for 
criminal prosecutions to commence and, if these were not met, a prisoner 
might be expected to petition for release. An alleged forger, John Ross, did 
so in 1731 having languished in the Tolbooth of Edinburgh for over six 
months.25 
 
3. Petitions for mercy/grace 
Petitions brought before various courts by vulnerable individuals often 
narrate rather tragic tales. Margaret Mitchelson, for example, petitioned the 
barons of Exchequer seeking supply from the crown.26 Her state of health 
was so poor she was unable to work. Her father was dead and she had 
received support from an aunt who was now also dead but who had left her 
the use of a room in the Canongate district of Edinburgh rent-free. The 
building where the room was located, however, had burned down and she 
had lost all her possessions, leaving her completely indigent. Similar 
                                                             
24 NRS, Court of Session, Books of Sederunt, CS1/14, fo. 14r. 
25 NLS, Saltoun papers, MS 17539, fo. 49. 
26 NRS, Papers of Clerk family of Penicuik, Midlothian, GD18/2798. 
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petitions, of course, were made to other potential benefactors, including 
town councils, guilds and even societies of lawyers. 
 Poor prisoners, press-ganged apprentices, and runaway slaves all had 
circumstances worthy of judicial time and attention. Few were more 
vulnerable than those imprisoned for debt who lacked means to support 
themselves. In Selkirk, in August 1810, a petition was presented to the 
magistrates on behalf of George White, a prisoner in the tolbooth.27 He 
sought the benefit of a 1696 Act anent the Aliment of Poor Prisoners.28 The 
bailies sought Answers (formal replies) to be lodged by White’s creditor-
incarcerator, David Murray, a writer to the signet. White deponed on oath 
that he had no means to aliment himself in prison and that, since the date 
of his imprisonment, he had not made any fraudulent conveyance of his 
property. Murray was ordered to pay 1s 6d per day to White for his 
maintenance, so long as he remained in the tolbooth. Almost two weeks 
later, no payment having been made, White was freed in conformity with 
the legislation. In a similar case in Inverness in 1808, the petitioner was 
‘famishing in Jail for want’ for several days while the agent for his creditor 
allegedly held on to the court papers. As a result, he sought the caption 
                                                             
27 Scottish Borders Archive [SBA], Hawick, D/47/80/3. 
28 K.M. Brown et al (eds), The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707 (St 
Andrews, 2007–18), 1696/9/151. Date accessed: 5 September 2017. 
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[arrest] of the law agent. The process is interesting because of a letter from 
the prisoner in question, Peter Campbell, to William Wilberforce, a leading 
figure in the contemporary anti-slavery movement, asking for his 
assistance and memorably stating that ‘as you have listened to the cry of 
the negroe, I trust you will not give a deaf ear to the moan of the prisoner’.29 
 In a complaint brought against James Robb, principal keeper of the 
Tolbooth in Edinburgh, two prisoners claimed that Robb prevented their 
friends from bringing them food. He allegedly insisted that they ‘buy Bread 
and Drink from James Rob’s Suttlery, bad in quality, and exorbitant in 
Price’. Their argument, which was ‘humbly submitted to the Humanity and 
Justice of the Court’ by their counsel, David Dalrymple, contains details of 
the prices they were charged and the equivalent charged outside of the 
Tolbooth.30 
 In some cases, the petitioner sought mitigation of a penalty imposed 
by the court. Sebastian Henderson, for example, petitioned in 1763 to have 
his disbarment as a procurator in Linlithgow mitigated to a suspension for 
                                                             
29 NRS, Miscellaneous papers, RH15/76/9/8. 
30 ALSP, Miscellaneous collection, ser. 1, Replies for Thomas Davidson Prisoner in 
the Tolbooth of Edinburgh, and William Blair late Prisoner there, 23 January 1738. 
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six months.31 Because the Court of Session was a court of law and equity, 
it was within the scope of the judges to reduce such a penalty if they were 
satisfied that there was sufficient cause to do so. This was not universally 
true in all courts. The Court of Exchequer, for example, proceeded by strict 
rules of law and had no power to mitigate any penalties.32 In the criminal 
court, approaches for mercy might be made first by seeking informal 
advice from one of the judges. In 1738 Brigadier Guest wrote to the lord 
justice clerk, on behalf of a grenadier who had shot and wounded a man he 
had mistaken for another, seeking advice on how to petition to have the 
sentence of public whipping stopped.33 
 An appeal to equity sometimes required a particularly emotive 
argument, and anyone skilled in the drafting of petitions knew the 
importance of gaining the sympathy and attention of the judges from their 
opening paragraphs. Robert Logan, imprisoned for a breach of trust against 
his master, the town clerk of Fortrose, began his petition for mercy as 
follows: ‘Will your Lordships vouchsafe to hear with patience for a little, 
a miserable man? Perhaps too undeserving to be listened to; but rendered 
                                                             
31 NRS, Court of Session, Books of Sederunt, CS1/14, fo. 181v; ALSP, Arniston 
collection, vol. 90, no. 16. Another example of mitigation appears at CS1/15, fo. 37r. 
32 NRS, Papers of the Society of Writers to the Signet, GD495/48/1/39. 
33 NLS, Saltoun papers, MS 16574, fo. 73. 
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too unhappy by the judgment pronounced against him, not to be the object 
of pity, and of your Lordships commiseration?’34 
 A variation on an appeal to the court’s equitable jurisdiction were 
petitions which arose after attempts at compromise, particularly through 
arbitration, had failed. Under regulations introduced in 1695, there were 
grounds upon which a petition might be brought to reduce a decreet arbitral 
[final outcome in a process of arbitration, with legal effect] on the basis of 
iniquity.35 Arbitration was common and the regulations were not intended 
to diminish its popularity. Therefore the grounds of reduction were 
expressed narrowly, encompassing only the corruption, bribery or 
falsehood of the arbiters. Despite this, a number of cases made their way 
to the court seeking, on the basis of a variety of facts (including the alleged 
drunkenness of arbiters), reduction of decreets arbitral. Litigants 
commonly claimed to have attempted to resolve their dispute by 
arbitration. Sometimes they even offered to have the matter arbitrated by 
the adverse party’s counsel. Intransigence, so they narrated, had ultimately 
rendered necessary their petition to the court. 
 
                                                             
34 ALSP, Arniston collection, vol. 90. 
35 J. Finlay, ‘Arbitration in eighteenth-century Scotland’, Juridical Review (2011), pp. 
277–91. 
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4. Petitions in litigated cases 
A petition was also a means of initiating litigation. It put a case to the 
judges which naturally invited them to appoint some other party to lodge a 
reply (technically known as Answers). Sometimes a document presented 
as a petition might quite easily have been described as something else. In 
1778, for instance, a petition by James Marshall W.S. was effectively an 
action of interdict, by which he sought to prevent the new keeper of the 
register of hornings, John Flockhart, from charging, contrary to custom, as 
much for copying half a page as a full page.36 In some cases, a petition was 
presented whose object might have been achieved by means of another 
process, such as a bill of advocation, by which a case from a lower court 
was removed to the Court of Session, often on the grounds of alleged 
defective procedure.37 
 It is reclaiming petitions, however, that are probably the most 
prevalent type of petition to appear amongst the surviving session papers.38 
                                                             
36 ALSP, Miscellaneous Collection, vol. 3 (1773-1777), The Petition of James 
Marshall, Writer to the Signet, 20 November 1778. 
37 ALSP, Arniston collection, vol. 40, no. 14, The Petition of Alexander Graham, and 
others, Inhabitants of the Village of Stromness in Orkney, Suspenders, 20 December 
1755. 
38 N.T. Philipson, The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session 
(Edinburgh, 1990), p. 45; J. Finlay, ‘The history of delay in civil procedure: Scotland 
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Any interlocutor pronounced by a judge could be reclaimed against, 
because Scottish procedure always favoured substantive justice over speed 
or finality of result. It was possible to petition a lord ordinary to review any 
interlocutor, provided the petition was brought within a defined period 
known as the ‘reclaiming days’. This practice was a constant source of 
delay in the court, despite acts of sederunt [secondary legislation] which 
limited the number of opportunities for bringing such petitions. A 
reclaiming petition would recite the interlocutor which the petitioner was 
asking the court to alter and it would be followed by Answers from the 
party favoured by that interlocutor. Typically, the Answers would be 
followed by further argument in the form of a Condescendence or Replies 
by the petitioner. Reclaiming petitions are notable for various ways in 
which petitioners verbalize their pretended unwillingness to trouble the 
judges further with a case with which they were already quite familiar. 
 Election cases concerning inappropriate procedure or error as to voter 
qualification, largely emanating from Michaelmas head courts, were 
brought by means of a petition and complaint. The procedure was subject 
to a Court of Session act of sederunt in November 1760, and it remained 
relevant until the old electoral law was swept away by the Scottish Reform 
                                                             
1600–1808’, in C.H. van Rhee (ed.), Within a Reasonable Time: The History of 
Delay in Civil Procedure (Berlin, 2010), pp. 145–6. 
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Act 1832.39 Disagreement with the judgment of a court of freeholders was 
often the premise for craving a warrant to serve the petition on whoever 
had objected to a petitioner’s qualification to vote. The Advocates’ Library 
contains whole boxes of petitions in election cases, and town council 
minutes record the reactions of newly elected councillors to the raising of 
such petitions. In December 1781, for instance, several members of 
Jedburgh council refused to have any concern in pursuing or defending a 
petition which had arisen from the Michaelmas election.40 The provost 
noted the necessity of providing proper defences in the Court of Session 
and appointing law agents in Edinburgh to do so. The council, by majority, 
then approved a motion authorizing the provost and magistrates to employ 
counsel for presenting their defences. The complaint was still depending 
before the court the following November although, by then, a former 
councillor who was one of the complainants had disclaimed the petition.41 
 Judicial petitions clearly involved power relationships, as litigants 
sought some form of relief from the judges in the court. Outside of election 
                                                             
39 Bell, Dictionary, p. 803. For discussion, see W. Ferguson, ‘Electoral law and 
procedure in eighteenth and early nineteenth century Scotland’ (University of 
Edinburgh, PhD thesis, 1957). 
40 SBA, Jedburgh Town Council minutes, BJ/1/9, fo. 72. 
41 SBA, BJ/1/9, fo. 106. 
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cases, they were generally not overtly ‘political’, but lawyers might suspect 
a judge of being partial, for political or personal reasons, and sometimes 
manoeuvred to have actions heard by a lord ordinary whom they deemed 
to be more sympathetic to their client or their cause. In the case of 
reclaiming petitions, lawyers often strategized on the basis of the 
composition of the court, taking into account illness and other factors 
affecting the bench. Thus they might present their petition at a point when 
they calculated that the majority of judges present might favour their 
arguments based on how they voted at earlier stages of the action.42 
 As well as petitions brought directly before the court, petitions made 
to the crown and other parties are often referred to in legal records. These 
typically sought steps to be taken in relation to legal actions which the 
judges themselves lacked jurisdiction to grant. In 1629, the king wrote to 
the judges noting that he had often been petitioned by the vassals of Mar 
and Garioch who wanted him to appoint an advocate to appear with them 
for the crown’s interest in defence of an action brought against them by the 
earl of Mar. The king, although he expressed himself to be 
 
loth to neglect that which may concerne our owne interest, so on 
the other part we ar not willing to schew our selff ane partie with 
                                                             
42 Finlay, ‘The history of delay in civil procedure’, p. 145. 
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one of our subjectis against another befoir our interest do 
appeare, bot ar willing to leave thame both indifferentlie to the 
ordinarie course of justice.43 
 
Once the crown’s interest was evident, the expectation would be that the 
lord advocate would enter appearance to ensure that it was defended. In the 
meantime, the king through his letter to the judges sought a declaration that 
the outcome of this particular dispute should not harm the crown’s 
interests. 
 
The petition as historical evidence 
Surviving petitions sometimes bear endorsements by the clerk of court 
recording forms of judicial deliverance and indicating the various steps of 
procedure that had been undertaken. In this sense, they are evidence not 
only of the legal argument they contain but also of the procedure 
undertaken as the matter made its way through the court. The clerk of 
session, in recording these stages of procedure, also noted very briefly the 
nature of the action in the minute book. Other sources, such as private 
correspondence, may provide details of the circumstances leading to the 
presentation of a petition. It is important to remember that behind every 
                                                             
43 NRS, Books of Sederunt, CS1/5, fo. 20v. 
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petition is a story, and a legal strategy, neither of which may be fully 
evident in the wording of the petition itself or other surviving sources. 
 Some printed petitions contain handwritten notes summarizing 
judicial opinions, sometimes with direct quotation. This can be very 
interesting evidence because judgments, until the nineteenth century and 
the development of a more modern style of law reporting, did not contain 
the reasoning of the individual judges in support of an interlocutor.44 The 
petition can also provide evidence of local and customary practices and 
social mores which are not always apparent in the pages of history books. 
An example is the concept of ‘Medicine money’ which every private 
soldier in service had deducted from his wages at the rate of 2d per month. 
The meaning of this ‘immemorial Practice’ was discussed in a petition 
brought in 1753 by William Park, a physician in Ayr, who was responsible 
for the garrison in Edinburgh Castle.45 In another petition, brought by the 
gardener James Calder against the Faculty of Surgeons and Physicians in 
Glasgow, who were desperate to retain their exclusive right to practise 
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blood-letting within the confines of the town, it was asserted on Calder’s 
behalf that ‘most gardners, whose residence is fixed, have practised 
blooding, mostly to the poorer sort of people’.46 
 
Authorship and style 
Lawyers, usually advocates, typically wrote petitions, and sometimes more 
than one was involved as a draft might be revised by another hand. The 
advocate who subscribed the petition, however, was not necessarily 
involved in either drafting or revising it. Writers to the signet and other 
agents also occasionally drafted Court of Session petitions but it was very 
rare for a party litigant to do so. 
 Some advocates enjoyed a particular reputation for drafting written 
pleadings, and might be called upon to compose, or redraft, a pleading 
without his name being mentioned in any court paper. Henry Cockburn 
picked out Robert Forsyth (1766–1845) as an example of a particularly 
industrious advocate commonly employed in this way: 
 
No modern can comprehend the lives of the well-employed 
‘writing counsel’ of the last generation. When every statement, 
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every argument, every application, every motion was made in 
writing, and every party was always entitled to give in a written 
answer; eight out of every twelve hours of the lives of these men 
were spent over inkstands.47 
 
Sometimes petitions written by younger counsel were deliberately 
circulated within the profession in order to gain attention and help establish 
a reputation. 
 Occasionally it was alleged that a petition had been brought without 
the authority or consent of the supposed petitioner. According to one 
petitioner, for a respectable lawyer to venture to present a petition from 
someone who had already disclaimed it, would be ‘extremely dangerous, 
and indeed would reflect Dishonour upon the Profession’.48 
 In terms of length, some writers were more prolix than others 
although petitions in summary matters were generally very short, typically 
one or two pages. In litigated cases, petitions could run to inordinate length, 
in some cases two hundred pages or more. Lawyers, in their drafting of 
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legal arguments, were quite willing to add bulk by making analogies and 
drawing examples from their reading into history and philosophy. The 
advocate Hugh Murray-Kynnynmound in 1739, for example, expounded 
on the history of the wine trade as part of his discussion of the question of 
whether Portuguese and Madeira wines should attract the customs duty 
applicable to Spanish wines. In the course of his discussion of the history 
of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, he noted how quickly Scots had 
become known in Europe ‘under the name of English’ since the Union, 
speculating that if, ‘by any humane Vicissitude, the Two Kingdoms should 
be disunited again, the Name of Scots Men would not immediately revive, 
but would come gradually into Fashion’.49 
 Legal petitions were intended to persuade those holding public office 
to exercise their judicial authority to grant specific relief to the petitioner. 
Where the petition was written in the context of litigation with another 
party, then it was written to persuade the judges to accept or reject a 
specific claim in law and the rhetorical arts might be employed to achieve 
this end. Specific claims in law, however, were often lost in a welter of 
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facts, as both law and fact were often in dispute. It took nineteenth-century 
reforms to the nature of written pleading to separate pleas-in-law from 
disputed matters of fact.50 
 Petitions seeking specific relief or admission to a particular office 
were generally short and often formal or, in the latter case, followed a 
stereotype. In litigated actions, there was much more scope in a petition for 
the free use of language in order to arouse the sympathy of the court, to 
attract and maintain the attention of the judges, and, sometimes, to entertain 
by means of subtle wit, and thus belittle the case put forward by the adverse 
party. 
 As might be expected, there are many interesting philosophical tropes 
in the reasoning put forward in litigated cases. The law of nature was often 
referenced to justify a desired outcome, sometimes in conformity with a 
rule drawn from Roman law or, more rarely, in contrast to one.51 The 
reasonableness of civilian principles was presented in such a way that it 
was deemed dangerous to depart from them. As one advocate put it, so far 
was his case supported by Roman law, with ‘great Justice and Reason’, 
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that the judges would not ‘willingly deviate from that law, which is justly 
deemed the Parent of our Systems of Jurisprudence’.52 
 Public utility, the liberty of the subject, good government, principles 
of equity and right reason were regularly appealed to as a basis for decision. 
According to the advocate John Craigie, in the right circumstances, ‘the 
Principle of Law is just, that a few Instances of private Wrong should yield 
to publick Utility’.53 In the context of that case, this meant that fairly 
adhering to the correct procedure, even if it occasionally resulted in 
excluding a just but incompetent claim, was morally and legally the right 
thing to do. 
 Lawyers had a wealth of law upon which to draw and in which to find 
appropriate principles. They freely quoted the extensive ius commune 
literature to which they had access. The privilege against self-
incrimination, for example, and the idea that a man need not swear against 
his own life, limb or fame, was justified in one case by reference to the 
French writer Antoine Favre (1557–1624) and the Dutch jurist Antonius 
                                                             
52 ALSP, Arniston collection, vol. 41, Answers for Alexander Grant writer in 
Edinburgh, 24 July 1756, p. 7. 
53 ALSP, Arniston collection, vol. 50, Answers for James Brands, Merchant in 
Aberdeen, Charger; To the Petition of Patrick Souper, Merchant in Aberdeen, 
Suspender, 21 February 1760, p. 8. 
30 
Matthaeus (1601–54).54 The Scots particularly favoured Dutch, French and 
German legal commentators, but they were happy to quote wider literature 
in support of their arguments. In particular, reference to English 
commentators, sources and statutes became more common as the century 
wore on.55 Direct citation of Roman law continued, but was much less 
prevalent by 1800 than it had been in 1700 with many Roman rules having 
by then been absorbed into reported cases which might as easily be cited 
instead. 
 
Publication and the public sphere 
A petition to the court was a public document and some petitions were 
clearly written for public consumption. In one case, it was claimed that a 
litigant, in order to hurt the petitioner’s character and livelihood, had 
drafted a printed petition and ‘most industriously dispersed Copies of it 
over the whole Country, and particularly in those Places from whence the 
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Petitioner’s chief Business as a Merchant arises’.56 It was not uncommon 
to find allegedly defamatory material in petitions, with an eye to 
influencing judicial (and perhaps wider) opinion. 
 Anyone who signed a petition was responsible for its contents. Law 
agents and advocates were summoned to answer for abusive phrases and 
judges occasionally ordered such phrases to be scored out.57 In 1741, Hugh 
Murray-Kynnynmound complained of injurious language in a petition 
brought against him personally, noting that the advocate who signed the 
petition had assured him that ‘some of the most offensive Parts of it were 
Interpolations upon the Draught after it came out of his Hands’.58 
 There is nothing in Scottish practice to mirror the political 
significance of mémoires judiciaires [printed legal briefs] in later 
eighteenth-century France.59 Scots petitions were usually, though by no 
means always, rather too technical to be of much interest beyond the courts. 
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That is not to say, however, that petitions brought before the Court of 
Session were not political in nature or that they failed to attract public 
attention or controversy. Indeed some legal actions were intensely 
political, leading to allegations of collusion and political motivation in 
bringing them. A petition brought by a political friend, who was then 
dilatory in prosecuting it, might, through the defence of lis alibi pendens, 
shield a party from a petition being brought by a political rival arising on 
the same facts.60 
 Judges themselves, of course, had political interests of their own and 
were stakeholders in a system of political patronage. The best-known 
political agent in the first half of the eighteenth century was Lord Milton, 
whose network of political intelligence, in the service of the earl of Ilay, 
was formidable. Milton and his friends could protect and offer rewards and 
offices to those who would further their political ends. In 1735 Charles 
Straton in Montrose wrote to Milton undertaking not to promise his vote to 
either of the young men who sought election ‘on the interest of two 
senators of the College of Justice’ who favoured rival political sides.61 He 
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would retain his vote at Milton’s disposal, despite the fact that one of the 
judges was his friend and the other his relation. 
  It was clearly recognized that adverse petitions in the Court of 
Session were simply a hazard of political manoeuvring. An election, in a 
country as litigious as Scotland, was often simply the prelude to litigation 
and thus petitions were a normalized concomitant of politics. Such 
petitions, however, depended on narrow points of law and were not 
intended for the wider public sphere or motivated by any desire to influence 




Petitioners to the Court of Session all sought an interlocutor of the court. 
Sometimes their petition initiated a process that was uncontested; 
sometimes it was the first blow in a disputed action or, as in a reclaiming 
petition, it might revive or prolong such an action. Every petition was an 
instrument to achieve a particular end and, while the situations which 
prompted the petition might be infinite, the ends to be achieved were not, 
although they might be categorized in a variety of ways. 
 Most petitions concerned the circumstances of private individuals and 
had little or no impact on the wider public. Some petitions did invoke 
matters of public policy, particularly matters arising from the interpretation 
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of statutes, especially the Act of Union which might be cited in cases which 
were by no means ‘constitutional’ in nature. 
 While petitions were often about individuals, they could have 
consequences for the public more generally. Large principles, concerning 
liberty or public rights, might be imported into cases involving matters of 
apparently trivial value which were enthusiastically and expensively 
litigated. What is of particular interest beyond their legal aspects, and is 
worth further study, are the unwritten assumptions which petitions hint at 
about politics, religion and social attitudes. As they concern all aspects of 
life, they have much to tell us about contemporary social mores. 
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